An internal MCP server fronts a payroll API. To save work, it takes whatever bearer token the client presents and forwards it unchanged to the payroll API. What security gap should the review flag?
Choose an answer to check it. Afterward, select any option to review its explanation.
User-asserted identity in a message is a real authorization gap, so it is a natural thing to look for. Nothing in this design reads identity from the message; the flaw is in how the server handles the client's token.
This is token passthrough: the server never checks that the token was issued for it as the audience, and forwarding it lets the payroll API trust a credential no one validated. That opens token reuse across services and the confused-deputy problem.
The specification requires invalid or expired tokens to receive a 401, so changing the status code would be wrong, and it would not touch the forwarding problem.
A shared key would remove attribution and isolation rather than add safety. The problem is not OAuth itself but that the server accepts and relays tokens meant for something else.
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